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THE EQUAL PROCESS CLAUSE: A NOTE ON THE
(NON)RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROMER v. EVANS AND
HUNTER v. ERICKSON
Jay S. Bybee*
In this Article, Professor Bybee uses the debate surrounding Romer v.
Evans to reexamine the Supreme Court's decision in Hunter v. Erickson and
the principle that a political majority may not restructure the political pro-
cess to make it more difficult for a political minority to obtain favorable
government action. Professor Bybee explains the questionable bases of
Hunter and succeeding cases, and then turns to the Romer decision and
discusses its incongruity with Hunter. After analyzing the meaning of Romer
in light of Hunter and other "equal process" cases, Professor Bybee con-
cludes that although the Court's analysis of Colorado's Amendment 2 re-
sembles its treatment of the laws at issue in the equal process cases, the
fundamental difference in the Court's treatment of Romer and the equal
process cases is that in Romer the Court failed to address the possibility of
suspect classification for classes defined by sexual orientation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado Supreme Court struck "Amendment 2' under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 because it infringed "the
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process."3 According
" Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. B.A., 1977; J.D., 1980,
Brigham Young University.
' "Amendment 2" responded to controversial ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, and
Denver banning discrimination on the basis of homosexual orientation. Amendment 2
effectively repealed these ordinances by forbidding state and other governmental entities
to "enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy" making "homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation ... [a] protected status." Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
' Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993) ("Evans 1"), subsequent opin-
ion, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) ("Evans IF'), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Following
passage of the Amendment, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. The trial court
granted the preliminary injunction, and in Evans I, the Colorado Supreme Court af-
firmed. In Evans II, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the entry of a permanent
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to the court, Amendment 2 "fenc[ed] out" homosexuals by requiring them to
obtain an amendment to the Colorado Constitution to obtain favorable treat-
ment based on their sexual orientation Amendment 2 thus
bar[red] gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from having an
effective voice in governmental affairs insofar as those per-
sons deem it beneficial to seek legislation that would protect
them from discrimination based on their sexual orienta-
tion .... Amendment 2 single[d] out one form of discrimina-
tion and remove[d] its redress from consideration by the
normal political processes.'
The Colorado Supreme Court found the principles of equal political process
in their "most explicit, and nuanced, articulation ' in a line of cases follow-
ing Hunter v. Erickson,7 which the court believed bore a "close[] resem-
blance to the question presented by Amendment 2."'
Like the Colorado Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that Amendment 2 "withdr[ew] from homosexuals, but no others,
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it
forb[ade] reinstatement of these laws and policies."9 The law thus
"disqualifi[ed] ... a class of persons from the right to seek specific protec-
tion from the law."1 This disqualification, the Court declared, put homo-
sexuals in a "solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both
the private and governmental spheres,"" an action so "unprecedented in
our jurisprudence" that Amendment 2 failed "even [the] conventional inqui-
ry" of rational basis scrutiny.12 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Colorado Supreme Court's decision, but it all but ignored Hunter v.
Erickson, acknowledging only that the Colorado Supreme Court had relied
on it.'3
Romer v. Evans was predestined for controversy. It was predestined
because its subject matter-homosexual rights-fairly ignites impassioned
political, legal, and religious debate. In the recent past, when the Court has
injunction.
" Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1285.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1279.
' 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279-86.
8 Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1279.
9 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1625 (1996).
10 Id. at 1628.
Id. at 1625.
12 Id. at 1628.
13 See id at 1624.
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confronted such controversial questions of general interest, it has attempted
to draw on our legal traditions to demonstrate the inevitability of its deci-
sion. 4 This idea of judicial precedent possesses a certain Calvinistic fatal-
ism: By ascribing to traditions or prior decisions a power beyond the present
Court's ability to control, precedent absolves the present Court of responsi-
bility for the decision the Court must make. Unfortunately, the Court's cryp-
tic opinion in Romer will do nothing to quell the public debates that inevita-
bly will attend it; nor will the opinion satisfy the legal community. The
Court's opinion eschews familiar equal protection principles and ignores the
Court's prior discussions of homosexual conduct, 5 substituting sweeping
platitudes for plain talk.
In the process of trying to fit Romer into the accepted canon of Four-
teenth Amendment cases, as students of the Constitution and constitutional
law we will attempt to give meaning to Romer, to classify it according to
established legal categories, to decide what it is. In this Article, I wish to do
something a little different. In the process of trying to understand what
Romer is, I wish to discuss what Romer is not. This Article uses the occa-
sion of Romer to re-examine Hunter v. Erickson and the principle that a
political majority may not restructure. the political process to make it more
difficult for a political minority to obtain favorable government action.
Along the way, this Article explains why Hunter and succeeding "equal
process" cases rest on a shaky foundation. I then turn to Romer and discuss
how the Court flirted recklessly with Hunter, but ultimately ignored it. I
attempt to draw meaning from this strange dance and conclude that although
Amendment 2 does bear a striking resemblance to the equal process cases
(as the Colorado Supreme Court thought), there is a twist in the Colorado
amendment (as the Supreme Court seemed to recognize). All told, it may
add up to the question fundamental to the current debate (as Justice Scalia
argued in dissent): Are homosexuals a suspect or quasi-suspect class?
" See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (relying on historical
condemnation of assisted suicide in concluding that there is no fundamental right to
assistance in committing suicide); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(concluding that stare decisis required continued recognition of a woman's right to an
abortion as established by Roe v. Wade and relying on other precedent to define the
limits of that right).
,5 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding as constitutional a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy because there was no fundamental right to engage
in homosexual sodomy); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g
mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court) (upholding a Virginia stat-
ute criminalizing sodomy); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (distinguishing state regulatory authority over homosexuality, which it
forbids altogether, and use of contraceptives by married couples, whose relationship the
state must allow and protect).
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II. HUNTER V. ERICKSON AND EQUAL PROCESS
A. Some Background on Due Process, Equal Protection, and Equal
Process
The relationship between the Due Process16 and Equal Protection
Clauses 7 of the Fourteenth Amendment is easily described: They both are
found in the Fourteenth Amendment and they both apply to "person[s]," but
they otherwise serve quite different functions."' The Due Process Clause,
as its terms suggest, is about process. At a minimum, the Due Process
Clause promises all persons the procedures prescribed by law before the
government may deprive them of life, liberty, or property. 9 In other words,
the government cannot decide to deprive someone of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without following the process :of law set forth by the legislature. This
concept leaves open the possibility that the legislature will decide summarily
to take someone's life, liberty, or property by, for example, having the trier
of fact flip a coin. At an early point during the development of due process
jurisprudence, however, the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process
Clause as having a substantive component. Depending on the nature of the
liberty or property interest at risk, the government must provide some mini-
mal level of process."0 The Court's interest in the substance of due process
should not be confused with its later development of substantive due pro-
cess, which has more to do with due substance than it does with due pro-
cess.
21
16 "[No] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17 "[No State shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 Cass Sunstein has observed that the difference between the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses is "structural"; that the two clauses "operate along different
tracks." Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163
(1988).
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No state shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.. .. ").
o See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 260-64 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989):
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.
21 For a good discussion of substantive due process, see John Harrison, Substantive
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The Equal Protection Clause, as its terms suggest, is about protection of
the laws. Unlike the Due Process Clause, which requires some minimal level
of process, the Court has not read the Equal Protection Clause to require a
minimum level of protection.22 The Equal Protection Clause itself does not
supply a baseline of protection. Rather, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that whatever level of protection a state offers to its citizens, it must offer
that protection equally to all persons.23 The Equal Protection Clause invites
a comparative rather than an absolute inquiry.
The Court's familiar equal protection analysis consists of' a tripartite
structure-strict, heightened, and rational basis scrutiny--that turns on the
identity of a party specially burdened by the law' or the right the party
seeks to exerciseY Persons claiming protection under the Equal Protection
Clause must demonstrate that they are members of some distinguishable
minority, upon which a disproportionate share of the burden of the law has
been deliberately imposed, or upon which a disproportionate share of the
benefits of the law has been deliberately withheld.' Parties burdened "be-
cause of' certain characteristics may demand that the law be tailored to the
law's legitimate purposes.27 The success of these claims traditionally turns
on a plaintiff's ability to prove two points: (1) that the law
disproportionately burdens an identifiable group and (2) that the group is
entitled to special protection because of the nature of the right at issue or
because of the insularity of the group, the immutability of the group's char-
acteristics, a history of discrimination against the group, and the political
powerlessness of the group.'
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence can be divided into
two broad areas, defined by context." The first and broadest area compris-
Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493 (1997).
2 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding that while there is an
"equal right" to vote, that right is not absolute; states may impose voter qualifications
and may regulate access to the franchise in other ways subject to strict scrutiny review).
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3 ("The State may not, of course, selectively
deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal
Protection Clause.") (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
2 See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
2 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576
(1964).
26 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
27 See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
2 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
29 For a discussion of the problem of defining the distinction between "substance"
19971
206 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 6:1
es substantive laws drawn to impose penalties or to confer governmental
privileges on the basis of suspect classifications.30 For example, the state
may not draw distinctions on the basis of race in the districting of schools
or in the hiring of employees.3' A state may not operate an institution of
higher learning and deny admission on the basis of gender.32 A state may
not hire or refuse to hire certain employees on the basis of their alienage.33
School districting, admission to college, and public employment are impor-
tant substantive rights, which (once created by the government) may not be
denied to persons because of their race, gender, or alienage.
The second category of Equal Protection Clause cases concerns laws
which govern the processes of self-government. These are the rules by
which we make other rules. These include laws on voter qualifications,'
voting districts, 35 government structure,' and validation of public referen-
and "procedure," see Harrison, supra note 21, at 497-98 (defining "procedural due pro-
cess" as acting "in accordance with established law" and "substantive due process" as
everything else).
30 Certain "fundamental rights," such as the right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), may also constitute substantive rights as I have used the term
here.
"' See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
32 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
" See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
34 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding
a New York statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it prohibited oth-
erwise eligible voters from voting in school district elections if they failed to meet the
qualification requirements of owning or leasing taxable realty or of being a parent or
guardian of a child enrolled in a local school).
31 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that an allegation that
North Carolina's redistricting legislation was so irregular on its face that it could only
be viewed as an effort to segregate races for voting purposes was sufficient to state an
equal protection claim); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that under the
Equal Protection Clause, seats in both houses of a bicameral legislature must be appor-
tioned substantially on a population basis); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding
that allegations that Tennessee legislation classifying voters with respect to representa-
tion in the General Assembly and failure to reapportion the seats in light of substantial
growth presented a justiciable claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
16 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (holding that
"police jurisdiction" statutes were constitutional because it was not unreasonable to
extend municipal services to areas adjoining cities and to require outlying citizens to
contribute on a reduced scale to payment for the services without permitting outlying
residents to vote in municipal elections); Sailors v. Kent Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105
1997] THE (NON)RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROMER AND HUNTER 207
da.37 These cases are something of a double-edged sword for the Court. In
this second area of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the Court has to
proceed cautiously because it is dealing with fundamental questions of self-
government, not simply government entitlements. The United States Consti-
tution says remarkably little about the process by which states must organize
and govern themselves. Only by reading with reflected light from the Con-
stitution of 1789 can we discern that states may not establish monarchies"
and should constitute themselves as representative democracies.39 The
amendments to the Constitution show greater attention to state governmental
processes, but the emphasis is decidedly on voting rights.40 To apply the
broad principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to state governmental pro-
cesses, the Court must skirt the brink between laws that genuinely strip
citizens of the power of self-government and laws that are the result of one
side prevailing in a political dispute.41 On the one hand, voting is "preser-
(1967) (concluding that because school boards are essentially administrative and not
legislative, school board members may be chosen by means other than by election, such
as by the elective-appointive system).
" See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking a
statewide initiative prohibiting school boards from requiring a student to attend a school
other than the one geographically closest to the student's home because it violated the
Equal Protection Clause by allocating governmental power "nonneutrally" by using the
"racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process"); see Julian N.
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... grant any Title of Nobility.").
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof. . . ."), repealed sub
silentio by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.").
40 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing representation in Congress
when states deny the right to vote to any male citizens, "except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime"); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State, elected by the people thereof. . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX,
cl. 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex."); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV,
§ 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote ... shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax."); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.").
"' The latter is the "political question" doctrine in its purest form. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the political question doctrine; criteria include
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vative of other basic civil and political rights,"42 and the Court will not
afford the usual presumptions of constitutionality to state restrictions on the
franchise.43 On the other hand, the Court believes the process by which we
adopt laws reflects our "devotion to democracy"" and "[t]he [s]tates have
long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised."'45
The process cases may also be divided. The first subcategory concerns
the rights of individuals to represent themselves or to choose their represen-
tatives. I will refer to these as the "voting cases." The second subcategory
concerns the actual process by which certain types of laws are adopted. I
will refer to these as the "equal process" cases.
The voting cases and the equal process cases are marked by important
differences. In the voting cases, typically the state (or some subdivision
thereof) has restricted who is eligible to vote or how much any given
person's vote will count. The voting cases involve limitations on the ability
of persons to participate in the political process, rather than the types of
rules that can be adopted.46 The Constitution supplies several examples of
such voting restrictions. The Fourteenth Amendment implies, for instance,
that states may restrict the electorate to citizens of the United States who
have not participated in "rebellion[] or other crime."4 The Twenty-Sixth
Amendment suggests that the United States or a state may decline to give
persons seventeen years old and younger the right to vote.48
Beyond these examples, the Court has struck attempts to limit the right
to vote or to limit the relative weight given to votes. In Kramer v. Union
matters that cannot be resolved by the courts "without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government"); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-66 (1973) (requiring proof that a group was deprived of an opportunity to partici-
pate in the political process, not just that it failed to secure "legislative seats in propor-
tion to its voting potential").
42 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
41 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
4" James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
45 Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1958) (citing Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1904)).
46 See, e.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 629 ("Our exacting examination is not necessitated
by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are
permitted to participate and some are not.").
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
(holding that the California Constitution and the implementing statutes disenfranchising
convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles does not deny equal
protection).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age.").
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Free School District No. 15,49 for example, the Court addressed whether
states can limit the franchise in special elections. New York law provided
that in certain school district elections, persons otherwise eligible to vote in
state and federal elections could vote in the school district elections only if
they owned or leased real property or had children in the public schools.
New York argued that the limitation permitted those "primarily interested"
in the elections to vote."° The Court said this argument invited the compar-
ison of "whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or
affected than those the statute includes."51 The Court found that the statute
was not "sufficiently tailored"52 and thus held the statute violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.53 In the "one person/one vote" decisions, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires that voting districts be
roughly equal in size so that every elector's vote has the same voting power
as every other vote. 4 In the recent spate of redistricting cases, the Court
has struck districts where the boundaries were determined by reference to
race.
55
In the voting cases, the challenged practices are not neutral with respect
to persons but are neutral with respect to the substance of the laws. In the
equal process cases, this situation is inverted; the electorate remains fixed,
but some issues are placed beyond the ordinary reach of the electorate.
9 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
S0 Id. at 631.
51 Id. at 632.
12 Id. at 633.
" See id. at 631. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black and Harlan, dissented.
According to the dissent, the classification was entirely rational. Persons excluded from
the school elections were not excluded from state elections and thus had direct recourse
to the state legislature to change the qualifications for voting in the school district elec-
tions. See id. at 639-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The Court has subsequently disapproved most restrictions on the franchise. See City
of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (striking an Arizona law that excluded
nonproperty owners from voting in elections held to approve the issuance of general
obligation bonds); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (striking a Louisi-
ana law that gave only "property taxpayers" the right to vote in elections called to ap-
prove the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility). But see Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding a law restrict-
ing voters in water district elections to landowners).
"4 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
" See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109 (1986) (concluding that political gerrymandering by the Republican majority in the
Indiana Legislature that adversely affected the Indiana Democratic Party was justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause).
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Some rules must be adopted by a process different from that required for
other rules. Thus, the law is neutral with respect to voter qualifications. It
does, however, restrict what the voters can do. The First Amendment and
the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses are examples of provisions
in the Constitution that forbid the passage of certain rules.56 The Constitu-
tion also provides that spending bills must originate in the House of Rep-
resentatives," a provision that gives relatively greater power to more popu-
lous states. Also, impeachment, ratification of treaties, and amending the
Constitution require supermajority votes.5"
Hunter v. Erickson,5" illustrates the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions
on this "equal process" category. In 1964, the Akron City Council enacted
an equal housing ordinance. The ordinance forbade discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin," and established a
Commission on Equal Opportunity in Housing to enforce it.6' Shortly
thereafter, by referendum vote, the electorate amended the city charter to
provide that any ordinance regulating use (including sale, transfer, lease, and
financing) of real property "on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry" had to be approved first by a majority of electors in a
general election.6' The Akron charter amendment did not repeal outright
the prior fair housing ordinance; however, it did require that the ordinance
be submitted to public referendum.62 Ordinarily Akron held a general refer-
endum on council-enacted legislation only when ten percent of the voters
requested it.63 The Court held the amendment unconstitutional because it
was "an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters differ-
ently from other racial and housing matters." The amended charter
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . ."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed.").
57 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives .... ).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("[N]o Person shall be convicted [upon impeach-
ment] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members [of the Senate] present.");
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur . . . ."); U.S. CONsT. art. V (requiring a vote of "two thirds of both
Houses" or two thirds of the legislatures of the states to propose amendments and re-
quiring ratification of proposed amendments by three fourths of the states).
S 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Id. at 386 (quoting Akron, Ohio, Ordinance 873-1964, § 1 (1964)).
61 Id. at 387 (quoting Akron, Ohio, City Charter § 137 (1964)).
62 See id. at 390.
63 See id
6 Id. at 389.
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drew a distinction between those groups who sought the
law's protection against racial, religious, or ancestral discrim-
inations in the sale and rental of real estate and those who
sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of
other ends .... Only laws to end housing discrimination
based on "race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry"
must run [the amendment's] gantlet."
Although the law drew no distinctions between "Negroes and whites, Jews
and Catholics[,] . . . the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minori-
ty."' The Court thus identified two potential problems: The Akron charter
amendment altered the process by which a class of laws could be enacted,
and the class of laws dealt with race.
B. The Equal Process Cases
Although Hunter is perhaps the best known of the equal process cases, it
followed by two years the Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey.6 In
Reitman, the people of California adopted by referendum an amendment to
their Constitution forbidding the state to
deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any
person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any
part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent
such property to such person or persons as he, in his abso-
lute discretion, chooses."
65 Id. at 390.
6 Id. at 390-91. Justice Harlan concurred. In his view, if the city's fair housing
provision had been defeated in an ordinary referendum requested by 10% of the voters,
blacks would have lost a political battle, but they would not have been denied equal
protection. Even if blacks were forced to seek their political goals through state legisla-
tion or through amendment of the state constitution, the legislation would have been
defeated through the application of "neutral principles." Id. at 394 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). By contrast, the amendment in Hunter had "the clear purpose of making it more
difficult for racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest."
Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). Only Justice Black dissented. He argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not bar Akron from repealing its statute. See id. at 396
(Black, J., dissenting).
67 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
68 Id. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964) (repealed 1974)).
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The effect of the amendment was to overturn state laws regulating the
transfer of private property, such as equal housing legislation.69 The Su-
preme Court began from the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not obligate California to adopt equal housing legislation, such that merely
repealing equal housing legislation would not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7" The Court, however, found that the amendment went beyond re-
peal-that "[t]he right to discriminate ... was now embodied in the State's
basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at
any level of the state government."'" The Court concluded that the amend-
ment did "not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discrimi-
nations," but that it "authorize[d] racial discrimination in the housing mar-
ket. ,"7
2
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart, dissent-
ed.73 According to Justice Harlan, the Fourteenth Amendment does not re-
quire the government to enact laws prohibiting private discrimination. Cali-
fornia merely repealed its prior statutes forbidding such discrimination.74
According to Justice Harlan, "[tihis runs no more afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment than would have California's failure to pass any such
antidiscrimination statutes in the first instance."7' Justice Harlan empha-
sized that California had no role in enforcing the amendment and that any
discrimination was only the result of private choices. 76 The Court's deci-
sion, he said, had far-reaching implications for the state-action doctrine:
Every act of private discrimination is either forbidden by
state law or permitted by it. There can be little doubt that
such permissiveness-whether by express constitutional or
statutory provision, or implicit in the common law-to some
extent "encourages" those who wish to discriminate to do so.
Under this theory "state action" in the form of laws that do
nothing more than passively permit private discrimination
could be said to tinge all private discrimination with the taint
of unconstitutional state encouragement.
7
69 See id. at 374.
70 See id. at 376.
71 Id. at 377.
72 Id. at 380-81.
7 See id. at 387 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74 See id. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7I Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 390, 392 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 394-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Harlan suggested that the Court's decision might actually discourage
equal housing legislation because it could be argued that legislatures would
interpret the Court's decision to mean that they could not repeal any such
legislation."
Reitman and Hunter were followed by James v. Valtierra,79 in which
California voters again amended by referendum their constitution. This time
the amendment provided that no "low-rent housing project" (including those
financed in whole or in part by the federal government) could be developed,
constructed, or acquired unless a community election approved it by majori-
ty vote." The Court upheld this provision, finding that "referendums dem-
onstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice."'"
The Court distinguished Hunter on the grounds that the California referen-
dum at issue in Valtierra did not distinguish on the basis of race; it applied
to "any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects which will be
occupied by a racial minority." 2 The fact that public housing proposals
had to clear an additional hurdle did not deprive anyone of equal protection;
if such proposals were found to deprive people of equal protection, states
would be prevented from holding referenda on any issue, unless they held
referenda on all such issues.8 3
Also during the 1971 term, in Gordon v. Lance,' the Court approved a
West Virginia requirement that political subdivisions of the state could not
incur debt and increase tax rates unless approved by 60% of the voters in a
referendum. The Court distinguished the West Virginia requirement from the
laws at issue in prior equal process cases, such as Hunter, on the basis that
' See id. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In one sense, the Akron amendment at issue
in Hunter did not go as far as the California amendment at issue in Reitman. The Akron
amendment did not repeal outright the city fair housing ordinance. Rather, it required
that the amendment pass the additional hurdle of a referendum vote. It is true that Ak-
ron created a hurdle that California did not, but the California constitutional amendment
was final on the question of fair housing laws, while the Akron amendment left open
the possibility of such laws. Neither law, of course, was permanent; both the Akron and
California amendments could be repealed in the same way in which they were passed,
through "neutral principles." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
80 Id. at 139.
S Id. at 141.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 142. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sented. They thought that the California amendment expressly singled out low-income
persons, thereby classifying persons on the basis of poverty. See id. at 144-45 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that classifications on the basis of poverty
are suspect and demand "exacting judicial scrutiny." Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
403 U.S. 1 (1971).
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"the West Virginia Constitution singles out no 'discrete and insular
minority' for special treatment."85 The Court thought that the class singled
out in Hunter was "clear-'those who would benefit from laws barring
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations."' ' In the West Virginia
scheme, however, there was "no independently identifiable group or catego-
ry that favor[ed] bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing., 87 As
in Valtierra, the Court treated Hunter as a case principally about disparate
racial impact, not about selective changes in the legislative process.
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,8" the Court proffered its
most detailed and sophisticated explanation for its equal process decisions.
The Seattle School Board voluntarily had adopted busing to alter the racial
balance in Seattle schools.8 9 In a state-wide referendum, the citizens of
Washington adopted Initiative 350, which provided that "no school
board ... shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the
student's place of residence."9 The Court found that Hunter applied, offer-
ing a "simple but central principle": "laws structuring political institutions or
allocating political power according to 'neutral principles'-such as the
executive veto, or the typically burdensome requirements for amending state
constitutions-are not subject to equal protection attack, though they may
'make it more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation.' 91
The Court continued:
the political majority may generally restructure the political
process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to
85 Id. at 5.
Id. (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
87 Id.
8 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
89 See id. at 461.
' Id. at 462 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981) (repealed 1991)). The
Initiative contained certain exemptions for special education, safety concerns, and court-
ordered busing.
9' Id. at 469-70 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394 (Harlan, J., concurring)). The
Court explained that in Hunter,
[t]he evil condemned ... was not the particular political obstacle of mandatory
referenda imposed by the Akron charter amendment; it was, rather, the compara-
tive structural burden placed on the political achievement of minority interests.
Thus, in Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified in
such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide electorate.
Similarly here, the power to enact racial legislation has been reallocated. In each
case, the effect of the challenged action was to redraw decisionmaking authority
over racial matters-and only over racial matters-in such a way as to place com-
parative burdens on minorities.
Id. at 474-75 n.17.
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secure the benefits of governmental action. But a different
analysis is required when the State allocates governmental
power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a
decision to determine the decisionmaking process.'
The Court concluded that Initiative 350 imposed "substantial and unique
burdens on racial minorities."93
In Seattle School District No. 1, the Court further argued that Initiative
350 reallocated power over racial problems that might be addressed through
forced busing.94 Initiative 350 took the authority to impose forced busing
from the School Board and lodged it in the state legislature or the elector-
ate.95 "[T]hose championing school integration ... [must] surmount a con-
siderably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable legislative ac-
tion." 96 Finally, the Court distinguished Initiative 350 from the simple re-
peal of the School Board's busing decision. The Initiative not only affected
the immediate past decisions of the School Board, but "burden[ed] all future
attempts to integrate Washington schools ... by lodging decisionmaking
authority over the question at a new and remote level of government. '
Four members of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, dissented.
They noted that a school board's decision not to assign students on the basis
of race does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, nor does the Fourteenth
Amendment require that school decisions be made locally, rather than state-
wide. Justice Powell stated that the "only relevant constitutional limitation"
on a state's structure of its political institutions was whether the state had
placed a "special burden[] on racial minorities within the governmental
process."98 Because the Initiative did not "uniquely or comparatively bur-
den[]" minorities, Hunter was "simply irrelevant."'"
On the same day the Court decided Seattle School District No. 1, the
Court decided Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education."° Before
Crawford reached the Supreme Court, the California courts construed the
California Constitution to mean that California school boards had an obliga-
tion to alleviate segregation in public schools, whether or not the segrega-
92 Id. at 470.
9 Id. The Court admitted, however, that the proponents of Initiative 350 crossed
racial lines. See id. at 472.




98 Id. at 493 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391
(1969)).
I d. at 498 (Powell, J., dissenting).
l0o 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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tion was intentional. 1' In 1979, California voters adopted Proposition I,
which amended the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Cali-
fornia Constitution to provide that no California state court could impose an
"obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assign-
ment or pupil transportation" unless such remedy was required by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." The Court found
that California voters merely had limited their courts to the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment and, accordingly, that this limitation could not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court denied that Proposition I used
a racial classification because no person was to be treated differently based
on race. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal
of race-related legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal
Constitution in the first place."' 3 The Court recognized, however, that the
California Constitution still required school boards to desegregate their
schools, even though Proposition I limited the power of the state courts to
enforce the obligation."° The Court simply denied that Proposition I had a
disproportionate effect on racial minorities.0"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan,
explained why he believed Crawford and Seattle School District No. 1 were
consistent. It was true that California voters had made it more difficult for
schools to achieve desegregation, but California had not changed the politi-
cal process, only the judicial remedies available."5 "[R]uling for petition-
ers on a Hunter theory seemingly would mean that statutory affirmative-
action or antidiscrimination programs never could be repealed, for a repeal
of the enactment would mean that enforcement authority previously lodged
in the state courts was being removed by another political entity."'" The
same entity-the people of California-that had adopted the California Con-
stitution had changed it. °"
101 See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
102 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532 (quoting CAL. CONST. art I, § 7(a)).
103 Id. at 538.
1"4 See id. at 536 & n.12, 541.
'o' See id. at 545. The Court distinguished Crawford from Hunter. The Akron ordi-
nance at issue in Hunter did not expressly discriminate on the basis of race; rather, the
law singled out "persons seeking antidiscrimination housing laws," who were "presump-
tively racial minorities." Id. at 541.
106 See id. at 546-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108 Justice Marshall dissented. For Justice Marshall, Proposition I was not a mere
repeal, but a mechanism through which the "rules of the game have been significantly
changed." Id. at 555-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Citing Seattle School District No. 1,
Hunter, and Reitman, Justice Marshall pointed out that in each of those cases the Court
had rejected the "mere repeal" theory because the "alleged rescission was accomplished
by a governmental entity other than the entity that had taken the initial action, and re-
sulted in a drastic alteration of the substantive effect of existing policy." Id. at 557
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C. First Principles of Equal Process
Three fundamental propositions, or lemmas, emerge from the equal
process cases:
Lemma 1: The Fourteenth Amendment imposes no obligation on states to
adopt antidiscrimination legislation."
Lemma 2: If a state adopts antidiscrimination laws, the state does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment if it later repeals that legisla-
tion."'
Lemma 3: The Fourteenth Amendment requires that states govern them-
selves through neutral principles.1"'
Consider each of the propositions. First, Lemma 1 is implicit in the negative
phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause: "No state shall . . . ." As such,
states must refrain from enacting or enforcing laws that deny equal protec-
tion, but the states have no affirmative obligation to enact legislation that,
for example, would forbid decisions on the basis of race. If state govern-
ment discriminates on the basis of race, state legislation forbidding such
practice would duplicate the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, states
have no obligation to ban private acts of discrimination because the Four-
teenth Amendment does not reach private acts."2 Lemma 1 acknowledges
the sufficiency of the Fourteenth Amendment as a remedy for a state's fail-
ure to protect persons equally. The Equal Protection Clause does not require
a minimum baseline of protection, but it does require that whatever protec-
tion a state affords must be provided on an equal basis.
Lemma 2 follows logically from Lemma 1. If a state has no affirmative
obligation to enact a class of laws, it may repeal the laws it has enacted.
The state may undo that which it had no obligation to do in the first place.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Proposition I constituted a barrier between minority school
children and their rights under the state constitution, and that barrier applied uniquely to
court-enforced busing. See id. at 559 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535, 538; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376
(1967); see also id. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538; Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 483 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 n.5 (1969).
. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
112 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state courts from enforc-
ing racially restrictive covenants). Professor Tribe suggests that Shelley and Crawford,
see supra discussion accompanying notes 100-08, are inconsistent. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-17, at 1488 (2d ed. 1988).
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Confusion over Lemma 2 occurs when the courts do not look at an entire
sequence of events and, instead, engage in marginal analysis. Let us suppose
that the Akron City Council enacts a fair housing law-a law that (by
Lemma 1) the city had no obligation to adopt. Does Akron act on the basis
of race when it repeals the antidiscrimination law? The answer, according to
a marginal analysis, is "yes." The repealing law is plainly a law about race,
racial minorities are worse off after repeal than before, and racial animus,
therefore, likely motivated some legislators.
This marginal analysis is attractive but flawed. The flaw in the "no
repeals" logic is that it treats race-specific legislation asymmetrically. Both
the original fair housing law and the law repealing it were neutral as to any
particular race. Although both the benefit conferred by the original legisla-
tion and the incidence of its repeal disproportionately affected minorities,
throughout its passage and repeal the law applied equally to all persons. A
"no repeals" rule would be a ratchet, allowing only protective legislation.
Ironically, a "no repeals" rule would be the most serious constraint on pro-
cess because it would not permit a law to be changed once it was passed
and, therefore, would bind all future legislatures. In effect, it would be a
rule that says, "there shall be no other rules." Additionally, as Justice Harlan
pointed out in Reitman, if the Court adopted this position, states would react
to preserve their options by refusing to pass antidiscrimination legisla-
tion."3 The result would be that less antidiscrimination legislation would
exist in the future, not more.
Lemma 3 states the basic requirement of the Equal Protection Clause as
applied to the law-making process. Although I have taken neutrality as a
general statement of equality principles, Lemma 3 does not answer the prob-
lem of sequencing or marginal analysis: At what point in time do we ask if
the process is neutral? Lemma 3 gives us no guidance regarding the level at
which "neutral principles""' 4 must be employed. To remove from local
school districts the power to use forced busing to integrate the schools, the
people of Washington passed a neutral referendum provision; the referen-
dum mechanism could just as easily have been used to require busing for
integration. The referendum mechanism was content-neutral. Washington's
Initiative 350, at issue in Seattle School District No. 1, however, plainly was
not content-neutral; it was highly political, which is true of almost all legis-
lation.
With these lemmas in mind, I wish to discuss a series of hypotheticals
based on Hunter. First, suppose that the Akron City Council passed a fair
housing act and subsequently repealed it. According to Lemma 1, the Akron
City Council had no obligation to enact a fair housing provision. By Lemma
2, Akron did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by repealing it, even
13 See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 394 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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though race discrimination was the subject matter of the law and the law
repealing the fair housing legislation was heavily supported by minorities.
What if Akron also provided that all future fair housing laws would have to
be submitted for public referenda? What if the Akron City Council an-
nounced that because of its past experience with fair housing legislation, it
wished to ensure adequate political support for future fair housing legisla-
tion by requiring the support of three-quarters of the Council? In either of
these cases, fair housing laws have to pass an additional hurdle, having a
different "gantlet""' 5 to run than other legislation. Does having to pass
such an additional hurdle violate Lemma 3? Akron has placed an additional
obstacle in the path of fair housing legislation, and the referenda or
supermajority requirements will be difficult to overcome; indeed, the hurdle
appears insuperable. The supermajority rule itself, however, may be avoided
by a majority vote. It requires no more political support to change the rules
about passing fair housing laws than it does to adopt the rules themselves.
Stated another way, if there is sufficient political support for a substantive
fair housing law, the "no fair housing" rule should not be an obstacle to its
enactment. Through the application of the same "neutral principles" of legis-
lation by which the "no fair housing" rule was adopted, the rule may be
repealed and fair housing legislation enacted.116
Next, suppose that Akron repealed its fair housing law and said nothing
about future fair housing acts. A group of citizens attempted to get the Ak-
ron City Council to enact new fair housing legislation, but the Council,
recognizing the inevitable, bowing to political pressure, or reflecting changes
in its composition, refused to enact new legislation. This scene recurred year
after year. Under Lemmas 1 and 2, the City Council did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Lemma 3 also should be satisfied because the
process for adopting legislation was not altered in any way, and no one
alleged that the process was unfair from the outset.
In this hypothetical, over time it has become apparent that Akron has
developed a policy and practice of not having fair housing legislation. In
effect, the iterative process of either the Council refusing to enact fair hous-
ing legislation or the Council enacting and the electorate repealing fair hous-
ing legislation has created an informal rule concerning fair housing. Would
the informal rule violate the Equal Protection Clause? Would the analysis
change if Akron adopted a formal rule? What if the City Council actually
adopted a rule prohibiting the introduction of fair housing legislation? To
115 Id. at 390.
1"6 Even if Akron tried to cement the "no fair housing legislation" rule by providing
that the rule itself required a three-quarters vote to revoke it, at some point a simple
majority vote will be required to unravel the layers of insulating devices. See John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L. 483, 503-04 (1995).
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those seeking fair housing legislation, the rule seems quite unfair. The rule,
however, simply recognizes what has regularly occurred in Akron. More-
over, the rule is self-enforcing. If the Akron City Council does adopt fair
housing legislation, it is unlikely that the Council's prior rule will prevent
its enforcement. Either the Council simultaneously will revoke or waive its
prior rule, or the passage of the legislation will be deemed an implied re-
peal. In any event, the "no fair housing" rule can be repealed by the same
process through which it was passed, by simple majority vote." 7
What if, instead of the Akron City Council adopting a rule forbidding
fair housing legislation, the citizens of Akron in a public referenda, or even
the Ohio legislature, imposed the rule on the Council? Imposing the rule in
this way introduces a new element-the "no fair housing" rule now has its
origins in some other body so that the City Council no longer has the power
to overrule, waive, or revoke the "no fair housing" rule. The argument that
the repeal effected by a different political body violates the Fourteenth
Amendment" 8 strikes me as contrived. The "no fair housing" rule was
adopted pursuant to a set of neutral principles-the principles governing all
referenda. The referendum mechanism can be used equally to forbid fair
housing legislation or to compel it; it may be used for politically charged
matters, such as fair housing or forced busing (as in Hunter or Seattle
School District No. 1), or for important, but more mundane matters, such as
local government debt limits (as in Gordon v. Lance). Furthermore, what the
people have worked through a referendum may be undone through the same
set of neutral principles. It is no harder to repeal a law enacted by a referen-
dum (or to amend a state constitutional provision) than it was to enact it in
the first place. The process is equal because it is the same. If a repeal is
unattainable, it is because it is a politically unlikely outcome, not because
the process is unfair.
The contrary rule, which the Court adopted in Seattle School District
No. 1, for example, shows great disdain for democratic self-government.
Referenda are populist self-help measures, an end run around recalcitrant
public officials. The contrary rule values the decisions of public officials
over the wishes of the electorate; the political views of a municipality to
those of a state. Carried to its logical extreme, the Court's extant position
would hold that a "no fair housing amendment" to the United States Consti-
tution would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
If, as I have argued, the equal process cases are flawed applications of
neutral principles,"9 one must ask how the Court should have dealt with
117 See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 546-47 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
118 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474-75, 483-84 (1982).
119 See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1440-46 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the Hunter doctrine in the context of California's Proposition 209, which
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the rules adopted in Hunter and Seattle School District No. 1. The Court
should have dealt with those rules as it would any other substantive law." °
The arguments over process are largely irrelevant, distracting us from the
real issues presented. The real question in Seattle School District No. 1 was
whether Washington's ban on self-imposed busing violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. That the rule was adopted by referendum was of no conse-
quence; that the statewide rule reversed locally adopted policies was evi-
dence of its broad-based support, not its ill motives.
This is not to say that no rules restricting political processes violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Obviously, there are limits. For example, a state
could not adopt a rule prohibiting referenda proposed by African-Americans.
Nor could a state, without justification, adopt a rule that prohibited only
Akron from passing fair housing laws. These limitations exist, however,
because the substance of the laws treats individuals differently, not because
the process is unfair. If the Court took its equal process principles seriously,
then any change in the process by which any class of laws may be enacted
would violate the Equal Protection Clause. This has not been the case."'
III. ROMER, HUNTER, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE
How do the principles of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
apply to Romer? The Colorado Supreme Court thought that the Hunter line
of equal process cases bore a "close[] resemblance" to the issues surround-
ing Amendment 2,122 while the United States Supreme Court barely
deigned to cite them." 3 Surely the Hunter line of decisions supported the
result the Court reached; Romer was plainly within the reach of those deci-
sions. 24 Does the Court's failure to do more than mention that the deci-
sions were the basis for the Colorado Supreme Court's decision suggest that
prohibits all government discrimination and preferential treatment on the basis of race,
sex, color, ethnicity, and national origin), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3181
(1997). At one point in its discussion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Court's equal
process principles left it "a little perplexed." Id. at 1441.
120 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538 (noting that "the Court has recognized that a dis-
tinction may exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state
action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters") (footnote omitted).
121 See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).
122 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1279 (Colo. 1993).
123 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996).
124 See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 257, 280 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the
1995 Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289, 296-99 (1997); Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment,
Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Partici-
pate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 841 (1995).
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Hunter was not persuasive to the Court? Unfortunately, the grounds on
which the Court decided Romer were not better established."z As I discuss
in this section, perhaps the Court recognized that Hunter did not solve its
problem.
Let me begin with the Supreme Court's analysis of Amendment 2. In
Section I of the opinion, Justice Kennedy began with the observation that
Amendment 2 "repeal[ed] [the Aspen, Boulder and Denver] ordinances to
the extent they prohibit discrimination on the basis of 'homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.""' This state-
ment accurately described one effect of Amendment 2, but, as the Court
must have known, was of no legal consequence; the Court did not even
bother to recite for the record that repeals do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Court then found that Amendment 2 did "more than repeal" the
Aspen, Boulder, and Denver ordinances. 7 It also "prohibit[ed] all legisla-
tive, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the named class." 12' Again, these statements accurately
describe Amendment 2, but it is not clear what significance, if any, the
Court attached to these facts. Legislative, executive, and judicial actions to
protect gays and lesbians were prohibited because the Colorado referendum
adopted Amendment 2 as an amendment to the Colorado Constitution. The
Court's observation that decisions about a particular subject matter (protect-
ed status for homosexuals) had been removed from the control of one level
of government (municipalities) to a higher level (state government) set the
stage for invoking Seattle School District No. 1.129
The Supreme Court then summarized its analysis: "[Amendment 2]
withdr[ew] from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from
the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forb[ade] reinstatement of these
laws and policies."'30 In other words, the Amendment repealed protection
125 The equal process cases figure prominently in the Ninth Circuit's recent opinion
upholding California's Proposition 209 and in the dissents from the denial of rehearing
en banc. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g
en banc denied, 1997 WL 563160 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 1997) (Schroeder, J., dissenting;
Norris, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3181 (1997). Despite
Hunter's absence from Romer, the Ninth Circuit cited Romer as the Court's "most re-
cent 'political structure' case." Id. at 1441.
12 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. Il, § 30b).
127 Id. at 1623.
128 Id.
129 See id. at 1624, 1626-27.
130 Id. at 1625; see also id. at 1624-25 (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270,
1284-85 (Colo. 1993) (stating that Amendment 2 "repeal[s] existing statutes" and "pro-
hibit[s] any governmental entity from adopting similar ... statutes ... unless the state
constitution is first amended to permit such measures")).
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and made it more difficult to secure such protection in the future (because
the Colorado Constitution would have to be amended). To this point, the
Supreme Court offered no concerns that had not been addressed direct-
ly-indeed, well-supported-by the Hunter line of cases. The Court, while
describing the effect of Amendment 2 as a repeal and restructuring of gov-
ernmental process for homosexuals, had not yet concluded that any of this
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's coy observations were a
tease-a hint of a violation without any conclusion, analysis, or reference to
arguably analogous cases.
In Section II of its opinion, the Court contrasted common law public-
accommodations law with "contemporary" statutes, which "depart from the
common law by enumerating the groups or persons within their ambit of
protection. '13 Colorado had not limited the enumerated groups to those
recognized in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, but had included
"an extensive catalogue of traits," including age, military status, marital
status, pregnancy, and political affiliation."' Amendment 2, the Court said,
"bar[red] homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that
these public-accommodations laws address."'33 The Court then speculated
that state administrators might be barred from even determining whether
government discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation amounted to
arbitrary and capricious action."'3 This consequence "would compound the
constitutional difficulties [Amendment 2] creates."' 35
The Court's analysis in Section II, however, begged the question. Let's
start with the Court's claim that homosexuals were not entitled to the pro-
tection of the current public-accommodations laws. If the Court meant that
homosexuals were barred from claiming discrimination on the basis of age,
military status, marital status, or political affiliation, 1' the statement surely
was not true. Nothing in Amendment 2 barred gays and lesbians from
claiming, for example, age discrimination. Amendment 2 barred homosexu-
als from claiming discrimination on the basis of homosexual status. For all
other enumerated bases of discrimination, gays and lesbians were protect-
ed.137 If the Court, alternatively, has asserted that homosexuals were barred
131 Id. at 1625.




136 See id. (stating "even if, as we doubt, homosexuals could find some safe harbor in
laws of general application . . ").
137 In fact, for Colorado to decline to protect any otherwise qualified person from
discrimination on the basis of an enumerated classification such as age would be a clear
violation of the promise of equal protection of the laws. If Amendment 2 meant that
homosexuals could not file age discrimination claims, the Amendment was the clearest
form of caste legislation and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. I do not
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from claiming discrimination as homosexuals, the observation is unremark-
able; the Court has not said anything but the obvious, and to make the ob-
servation is not to conclude that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause. We are left to puzzle over the Court's claim that government non-
protection policies towards gays and lesbians would "compound the consti-
tutional difficulties"'38 because to this point, the Court has not said a word
about the Constitution-it has not identified any "constitutional difficulties"
that could have been "compounded."' 39 The Court concluded Section II
with the observation that "[h]omosexuals [were] forbidden the safeguards
that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.' 40 Again, the Court
merely has identified that Amendment 2 (1) repeals legal protection that
homosexuals previously had ("the safeguards that others enjoy") and (2) has
restructured the process for obtaining future protection ("the safeguards that
others ... may seek without constraint").' 4'
The Court's analysis in Section II is troubling for an additional reason.
The Court faulted Colorado for first enumerating a list of protected classes
in public accommodations and then removing sexual orientation from the
list.142 The Court surely did not mean that Colorado would violate the
Equal Protection Clause if it did not include age or marital status on its list
of protected classes, just as Colorado would not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if it included age, but not marital status, on the list. To say that
Colorado must include some class of persons on its list defies Lemma 1.
Furthermore, all kinds of categories are not included on Colorado's list-the
illiterate, persons with communicable diseases, licensed cosmeticians, the
tall, the short, persons with male pattern baldness, and so forth. Surely
Colorado's laws are not infirm because persons with these characteristics are
not expressly protected. Colorado currently prohibits discrimination based on
certain legal, off-duty conduct, such as smoking. 43 If Colorado voters
adopted "Amendment 3" to prohibit its political subdivisions from enacting
laws giving smokers preferred, enumerated status, would Amendment 3
suffer from the same "compound[edl ... constitutional difficulties" as
Amendment 2?'" Are we so confident of the difference between status
read Amendment 2 to have done this. See id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dismissing
as unpersuasive the argument that Colorado would not prosecute assaults against homo-
sexuals).
138 Id. at 1626.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1627.
141 Id.; see also id. ("They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only
by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state constitution . . .
142 See id. at 1625-26.
141 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994) (citing 10A COLO.
REv. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (1990)).
144 The example is Cass Sunstein's. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
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(being a smoker) and conduct (smoking) that we can either automatically
approve Amendment 3 as conduct-driven or disapprove it as status-driven?
If Colorado cannot repeal sexual orientation as an enumerated class, it must
be because Colorado has a duty to protect sexual orientation. If Section II
holds that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on states
to protect persons on the basis of their sexual orientation, this would be
"unprecedented in our jurisprudence."'45 The Court, however, offered no
other explanation in Section II.
In Section III of Romer, the Court finally addressed the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court's analysis, however, was much too cryptic. Amend-
ment 2, the Court said, disqualified "a class of persons from the right to
seek specific protection from the law."'" The Court might have meant two
things by this statement. It might have meant that Amendment 2 impaired
the right of homosexuals to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances."7 We usually think of the right to petition the government as a
First Amendment, rather than a Fourteenth Amendment, right. Given the
doctrine of incorporation, however, the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant
(although the Court's discussion of general equal protection principles
would be out of place since the First Amendment applies to the states by
virtue of the Due Process Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause). These
problems aside, if the Court had the right to petition in mind, it owed us
some explanation of how Amendment 2 denied homosexuals the right to
seek redress. In contrast to the voting cases, 4' homosexuals were not for-
bidden to vote, nor were they denied the right to seek new legislation. What
homosexuals in Colorado lost in Amendment 2 was the power to have local
governments make homosexuality a statutory suspect class. That, we thought
until Romer, was a fair political fight.
Additionally, the Court might have meant that homosexuals; in order to
regain the favored status they enjoyed under the Aspen, Boulder, and Den-
ver ordinances, must run a different gantlet for their efforts to obtain other
legislation. This view is consistent with the Court's subsequent declaration
that "[c]entral both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1996).
' Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
146 Id.; see id. ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of
equal protection of the laws . . ").
147 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances."); see Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 655 n.9 (1991) (arguing that depriving a local government of the
power to bar discrimination against persons suffering from AIDS "[a]rguably ... re-
strict[s] the right to petition the government").
141 See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
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Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance." '49 This is again the language of the equal process cases. If
what the Court really had in mind was the running of the gantlet, why did
the Court not cite Hunter? Hunter demonstrates that, to the extent Amend-
ment 2 burdened a class defined by their political views about sexual orien-
tation, there was nothing "unprecedented in our jurisprudence" about it.
The Court's failure to invoke the equal process cases is twice troubling.
First, it is troubling because of what this failure says about Hunter. The
Court's analysis so clearly invited comparisons of Romer and Hunter that
the Court's failure even to mention the equal process cases suggests that
those cases are flawed. It was the equal process claims that Justice Scalia
addressed when he called the majority's logic "terminal silliness."'50 Had
the Court actually pressed its point to its logical conclusion, instead of just
hinting at the conclusion, its logic might have been silly. Instead, the logic
simply was missing; the Court set up the equal process claim and then
walked away from it. Hunter's absence from Romer may call into question
its continuing validity, or at least Hunter's validity outside the context of
race.15'
Second, Hunter's absence says something more about the Court's analy-
sis. Hunter's absence may not only show the Court's lack of faith in the
equal process cases as precedent; it also may demonstrate that the Court
thought the facts distinguishable. Although it would have been instructive
for the Court to have mentioned and distinguished the equal process cases
from Romer, in fact, Colorado's Amendment 2 is different from the laws at
149 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. At the least, the Court's choice of language is mis-
leading. Nothing in Amendment 2 "disqualif[ies]" homosexuals from seeking new legis-
lation. Amendment 2 does not approach the kind of disqualification that New York
visited on Morris Kramer, at issue in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
" Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
[T]he principle underlying the Court's opinion is that one who is accorded equal
treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treat-
ment under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the laws. If merely
stating this alleged "equal protection" violation does not suffice to refute it, our
constitutional jurisprudence has achieved terminal silliness.
151 Some commentators have suggested that Hunter is distinguishable from Romer
because Hunter and Seattle School District No. 1 "involved constitutionally suspect
racial classifications, and were thus ... distinguishable from Romer, which did not."
Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judi-
cial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 893, 957 n.35 2 . Professor Karlan
states that when race is removed from the equal process cases, the Court's analysis is
"unsatisfying. Romer turns out to be a lost opportunity for the Court to have given
some teeth to its otherwise entirely hortatory jurisprudence of political fairness." Karlan,
supra note 124, at 300.
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issue in the equal process cases in one respect. The equal process cases
dealt with rules that made the adoption of certain laws more difficult. Those
rules-for example, the Akron amended charter,' Washington's Initiative
350,' and California's constitutional amendments' 54---did not expressly
identify any particular classes of persons except by reference to their politi-
cal views on particular issues. Akron imposed additional procedures on all
those who favored fair housing legislation; that group might include, but
was not limited to, persons who would benefit from fair housing legisla-
tion.'55 Like those cases, Amendment 2 also erected a procedural hur-
dle-the requirement of a constitutional amendment-shared by all persons
who might seek protection for gays and lesbians, whatever their sexual ori-
entation. As Justice Scalia pointed out, that group would include many per-
sons who were not homosexuals.'56 Unlike the equal process cases, how-
ever, Amendment 2 also singled out a class of persons identifiable through
means other than their political views. It arguably did not merely burden a
class of persons disappointed in the repeal of gay and lesbian-protective
statutes and interested in the future protected status of gays and lesbians;
Amendment 2 actually burdened the class of gays and lesbians. Akhil Amar
has argued that, as written, Amendment 2 would protect heterosexuals from
discrimination in public accommodations.' 7 If so, Amendment 2 expressed
a bare preference for persons who are heterosexually oriented.
Despite the Court's professed concern with the process Colorado im-
posed on future laws favoring sexual orientation, the problem in Romer is
not the process. Indeed, for all of the Court's fussing over the additional
process homosexual-protective legislation would have to endure, the Court
could not-or would not7-make anything of it.' The majority might be
right, after all, that Amendment 2 preferred a class of persons. For that
reason, however, as demonstrated in Justice Scalia's dissent, the Court was
quite wrong to refuse to discuss Bowers and to confront the equal protection
question head on. In the final analysis, the Court's concern over repeal and
152 See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see also supra text accompanying
notes 59-66.
"' See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see also supra
text accompanying notes 88-99.
154 See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see also
supra text accompanying notes 100-08, 79-83, 67-78.
155 See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-91.
156 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157 See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 203, 207 (1996).
151 Sections I and II are so disjunctive from Section III that it suggests that Section
III was drafted independently. Perhaps Section III is not the original equal protection
analysis that followed Sections I and II.
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structure were atmospherics, a distraction from the question to which we are
entitled an answer. The real question in Romer is the question that whole
generations of students of the law wish to know: Is the class defined by
sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and does Bowers v.
Hardwic'59 inform this judgment?
IV. CONCLUSION
Hunter did not govern Romer (nor should it), but not for reasons well
articulated by the Court. If Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause, it does so for reasons other than the repeals worked by the Amend-
ment, or the process it imposes on future efforts to secure favorable legisla-
tion. If Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, it does so be-
cause, under the Court's jurisprudence, homosexuals are entitled to strict or
heightened scrutiny. Whether, however, homosexuals are entitled to strict or
heightened scrutiny is the one thing the Court could not bear to ask, much
less answer.
My analysis can be put to a simple test. If Colorado wants an Amend-
ment 2 that works, it simply should forbid laws that take sexual orientation
into account. Suppose Colorado adopted the following:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities, or school districts, shall enact, adopt, or en-
force any statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy whereby
sexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person
or class of persons to, a claim of protected status.
This proposal would repeal the three city ordinances that gave rise to
Amendment 2. It also would make it more difficult for persons in Colorado
to obtain preferences in any law based on sexual orientation. The incidence
of law would remain on those who favor a protected political status for
homosexuals, but the law would be phrased in neutral terms. The law no
longer would confer a formal preference on heterosexuals. The proposal
would fit squarely within Hunter and the equal process cases. Most impor-
tantly, the proposal would force the Court to say what it means.
1"9 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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